REASONING WITH UNBELIEVERS AND
THE PLACE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN

TERTULLIAN'S APOLOGy1

PAUL LIVERMORE

We are frequently told that deep faith causes intolerance. Fundamentalists persecute; those who look at religious questions dispassionately do not. Though the view
might have some truth, a survey of history casts doubt on it as simplistic.
Early Christians were persecuted by broad-minded Romans who insisted that
they must participate in civi l religion. Since sophisticated Romans did not themselves
believe in the gods, or at least did not believe in anything like we normally think of
when we use that word, we assume they did not care what Christians privately
thought. Further, until Celsus and Porphyry pagans never bothered to study the
faith. While the masses projected crude views on Christians, as they had on the
Jews, and accused them of violent crimes; the learned dismissed them as superstitious. 2 In his letter to Trajan, Pliny the Younger wrote 3
I do not doubt that whatever kind of crime it may be to which they have
confessed, their pertinency and inflexible obstinacy should certainly be
punished .... I thought it more necessary, therefore, to find o ut what truth
there was in this [their beliefs and mode of worship] by applyi ng torture to
two maidservants, who were called deaconess. But I found nothing but a
depraved and extravaga nt superstition, and I therefore postponed my
examination and had recourse to you for consultation.
Pliny, famous as an urbane Roman, would have rejected the claim that he prejudged their case, but he did not hope for Trajan to explain Christian beliefs. He
wanted advice on how to suppress the movement without making Rome appear
cruel. In other words: What was the politically most expedient way to make
Christians conform?
Less than a century after Pliny, Christians in North Africa were suffering under
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persecution. After becoming a Christian, T ertullian took up their case: His personality is
lege ndary. He thrived on debate, arguing with heretics and the official church after
becoming a Montanist, as well as with civil officers.
This article looks at Tertullian's debate with the officials in Carthage found in The
Apology. We w ill study the method he used in his defense of Christians. We are not asking so much what specific arguments he marshaled as what kind of arguments. Or, looking at the same issue from the other side of the equation, what kind of arguments would
Roman officials have found persuasive?
We attach to this inquiry a second. We intend to explore how the Scriptures figured in
The Apology's argument.

I. TERTUILLIAN'S TASK:

ARGUING WITH THOSE WHO DID NOT ACCEPT

CHRISTIAN PREMISES

Tertullian wrote The Apology to refute charges against Christians upon which the officials based their persecution. In chapter 2 he named four, two civil and public (sacrilege
and treason) and two private and supposedly part of eucharistic celebrations (incest with
mothers and sisters and the killing and eating of infantsl.
The latter two, incest and cannibalism, were scurrilous and propagated by rumor. That
did not make them less serious, since they grew from fear and hatred of the unknown.
We cannot tell just how many people actually thought the rumors true but evidence suggests a good number did until the middle of the third century.
Tertullian's defense against these two charges was to deny them. He noted that the
authorities could not present one person who had actually witnessed the acts. He also
pointed out how the acts were totally inconsistent with Christian faith and practice-much
more so than with pagan faith and practice. We will look at one case of this defense to
show how T ertullian argued in this regard.
The civil charges of treason and sacrilege were really more serious, since they arose
from an indisputable feature of Christian discipline, the restriction of worship to the living
God. Faithful Christians could not yield in the way Rome demanded they yield, to participate in civil religious ceremonies and offer supreme allegiance to the emperor, without
denying the faith. According to Roman law, Christians were guilty.
There are a number of ways T ertullian might have made his case to vindicate the
beleaguered faithful. First, he could have argued, as Western democracies now do, that
religion is a private matter, and the state has no right to impose its will so long as its sovereignty is not undermined. But Rome did think the church undermined its sovereignty,
and nothing in The Apology disputes that Tertullian thought religion a legitimate concern
of the state.
Second, T ertullian could have reasoned that since the state was ruled by evil people,
Christians should defy their laws. But this approach would have earned nothing but contempt as well as condemnation. Further, The Apology's tone suggests someth ing different
from defiance. It suggest an appeal to people who can reach a sound judgment. s This is
an genuine apology.
Finally, T ertullian might have argued that Christians should not be persecuted because
they were really not guilty of criminal acts. This is, in fact, the tactic he took. And it was
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for this reason that his pre-Christian work as a lawyer proved invaluable. He not only
knew the rules of legal debate but also practiced them with considerable skill.
But Tertullian's task was still not easily accomplished. True, the church now had the
advantage of an advocate skilled in legal debate, and he could marshal compelling arguments against the charges of infanticide and incest, but those of treason and sacrilege
were more difficult. As noted Christians, according to Roman law, were guilty; the public
character of Christian action in these two cases made the charges inescapable. 6
If Tertullian' s goal was to argue that Christians were not guilty of criminal acts and yet
acknowledge that in the cases of treason and sacrilege they systematically broke Roman
law, the only recourse left was to prove that the laws were flawed. He had somehow to
show that these laws, either as written or as commonly understood, were bad laws.
We will also inquire whether Tertullian could have used the Scriptures to any real gain.
Several options lay before him. First, he might have explicitly cited or alluded to them as
proof for his argument. But he could have done so and accomplished his ultimate goal only
if the officials would have accepted the Scriptures as authoritative, which they hardly did.
Two other possibilities lay before him. Following one of them, Tertullian might first
have given an apologetic for the Scriptures and then based his further argument on their
authority. In fact, he does offer in chapters 18-20 a kind of apologetic. But, as we shall
later see, he does not go on to make the Scriptures the basis for his remaining argument.
Or, T ertullian might have used scriptural themes but offered reasons why they should
be accepted as true other than that the Scriptures prove them to be true. In doing so, he
could have mentioned that these themes were scriptural and even that Christians adopted them because of the Scriptures. At the same time, however, he would have argued
that Roman officials should accept them because of other evidence. This last is the
method he follows in The Apology.
Before we go on several issues concerning Tertullian's implicit use of the Scriptures in
The Apology merit note. First, his method in The Apology differs sharply from that in his
works on heresy. For example, in the Ante-Nicene Fathers the translator, Holmes, identifies 326 citations or allusions to the Bible in Against Praxeas. In The Apology, a document
a quarter longer, Thelwall identifies only five. I have found more in The Apology, but certainly not enough to alter the impression the numbers give.
The short explanation for the difference between his method in The Apology and that
in the anti-heretical works is that the latter were written to those who accepted the
authority of the Scriptures, though the heretics did argue that they were the only ones
who properly understood the Scriptures. But since Roman officials did not accept the
Scriptures, an argument from them in The Apology would have been fruitless.
Having reached the preliminary view that Tertullian does not base his argument on
scriptural authority, we have to inquire whether we can reconcile this method with his
well-known rejection of human reason. The Prescription against Heretics (chapter 7) contains his famous remark contrasting human philosophy and God's revealed word and his
assertion that Christians have no need of any source of knowledge beyond their faith.
Granted, no one so prolific and creative as T ertullian can be held to rigid consistency, we
still query how the same person could say the one thing and then do the other. The contrasting methods seem to be main points in both documents.
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We mention this apparent contrast at the outset to indicate an issue that needs to be
taken up again at the end of our study. The issue can be put into the form of a question:
In order to be thoroughly scriptural and argue for a Christian view on this or that topic,
do we have to prove beforehand that the Scriptures offer the sole or even the primary
means of support? Or, to pose the question of the work we are presently studying, is
T ertullian thoroughly scriptural in The Apology 7
Our preliminary observations, therefore, indicate that in The Apology T ertullian primarily uses the Scriptures implicitly, that is, scriptural themes appear without any note to
the effect that they have their origins in the Bible. And even when he uses them more
explicitly by directly citing them or, as generally happens, by paraphrasing or alluding to
them, his primary point is not to use scriptural origin as the reason why pagans ought to
believe that an idea is true but simply to show this as the source from which Christian
faith and practice have sprung.
We now inquire into Roman legal practice which provided for a review of a law's legitimacy. Tertullian's effort to exonerate Christians required both that it be possible to
review a law and also that he follow the rules of legal review. Such a procedure did exist. 7
Before we can make sense of his argument, then, we must get critical aspects of the procedure in mind.
Roman law had originally grown from two sources, from the customs of early Romans
and the will of patricians and then in the imperial era from the rulers. Both kinds of law,
those from custom and those from the powerful, could very well be nothing more than
inherited, self-serving traditions. Those in power had a good deal to gain by making certain that such laws were not amenable to correction from a higher standard.
But a procedure for legal review did evolve within the Roman system. During the period of the republic, the principle of natural law was introduced into Roman jurisprudence.
The concept had already pervaded the Mediterranean world, Stoicism first coining its systematic, philosophical form. Settling the question whether Roman jurists adopted the concept directly from the Stoics or merely from their cultural milieu is unnecessary to our
purposes. During the time when Rome's hegemony was extended far beyond the Italian
peninsula, the idea of natural law had nearly universal acceptance and was profoundly
influencing Roman jurisprudence.
We should make a few remarks about natural law and its relation to jurisprudence.
First, natural law governs both that part of the universe which lack self-consciousness and,
especially in the case of human beings, that which possesses it. For humans, the good life
is achieved when people voluntarily govern their lives according to this law. Thus,
through clear thought we can discover natural law and through a positive will we can follow it. Second, Stoic ethics pivoted on the four principles of wisdom, justice, temperance,
and courage. Law was particularly concerned with the issue of justice. Third, in natural
law theory ethical questions precede legal questions. The validity of a law depends up the
degree to which it furthers justice. Fourth, since natural law is a universal principle, the
customs of people everywhere should reflect its influence. This does not mean that all
national laws are considered just, but that when they are compared, the pervasive character of natural law will appear. Thus, as the power of Rome extended farther and farther,
the jus gentium was regarded less as a mere reflection of various ethnic customs and
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more as ius naturale.
Now we consider briefly aspects of the procedure in Roman legal review. In a fine article on Tertullian's exegesis of Scripture j. H. Waszink 8 offers from Cicero (De inventione
2.40.1 16) four criteria for the examination of legal documents. Waszink makes the point
that the African father transferred techniques he learned in working with legal documents
to his study of the Scriptures. Putting aside the issue of method in interpreting the Bible,
we return to his task as an advocate before a Roman court. The citation mentioned above
is illuminating. Cicero writes that controversy over a law "arises from ambiguity, from the
letter and intent [ex scripto et sententiaIJ, from conflicting laws [ex contrariis legibusl, from
reasoning by analogy, from definition." Thus, Cicero offers four ways in which the meaning of a law can be examined to determine whether it is an appropriate law or has been
understood appropriately. The four ways are: (I) discovery of original intent, (2) comparison of contradictory laws, (3) discovery of meaning by analogy, and (4) giving precise definition to the law. The principle of natural law is seen most clearly in criterion three, but
obviously provides the background for the other three criteria as well.
Before we conclude this section on the practice of Roman legal review, we make several observations which seem to contradict what we have just observed. First, Roman
jurisprudence did not begin with the broad theory of natural law and extrapolate from it
statutes for particular situations. That is, it did not work from the general to the specific.
Rather, its tendency was to review current laws in the light of the general principles and
how successfully they achieved equity. It worked from the specific to the general and
then back to the specific.
The application of this to Christians is obvious. Roman courts would naturally have
seen the laws which required compliance with civil religion as appropriate. The mere
assertion that natural law confirmed the Christian case and refuted the law's legitimacy
would have struck them as odd. Only through a detailed argument could the conformity
of the Christian case with the principle of natural law have been made compelling.
Second, the fine achievements of Roman law in adapting natural law did not result in
its disinterested application to all cases. Those involving Roman citizens and their property
garnered the most impressive displays of such legal review. Rank injustice to non-citizens
and common people were never reviewed and do not appear to have caused much soulsearching among the government. C. E. M. de Ste. Croix 9 has pointed out that experts in
Roman law have long noted a contradiction between high standard and narrow application. In particular, magistrates were given a free hand in cases of criminal law to interpret
and apply statutes. Their arbitrary cruelty, extra ordinem procedures were sanctioned by
the state. They did not act illegally.
Thus, in the time of Tertullian, Roman legal practice offered a method of judicial
review by which a statute or a custom could be examined. The general principle behind
this procedure was that of natural law. Accordingly, a legal statute was appropriate to the
degree it reflected natural law. Roman jurists were charged not only with the task of prosecuting or defending on the basis of enacted laws, but also with examining the appropriateness of laws. However, it would not have been a foregone conclusion that the principle of natural law in the case of Christians would have led to their exoneration. In the
mind of a typical Roman jurist, Christian belief was superstitious, hardly something sup-
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ported by natural reason. Further, they not only found Christian belief illegal, they also
considered it dangerous for the welfare of the state and thus treasonous.
II.

TERTUWAN'S REASONING IN THE ApOLOGY

We query now whether Tertullian in fact appealed to the right of legal review in The
Apology. In chapter 4 he indicates how he intends to proceed and he explicitly mentions the legal principle he will use in arguing his case. (J have edited the translation myself
to divide the paragraphs into shorter and more logical units.)
Well, if I have found what your law prohibits to be good, as one who has
arrived at such a previous opinion, has it not lost its power to debar me from it,
though that very thing, if it were evil, it would justly forbid me? If your law has
gone wrong, it is of human origin, I think; it has not fallen from heaven. Is it
wonderful that man should err in making a law, or come to his senses in rejecting it? Did not the Lacedaemonians amend the laws of Lycurgus himself, thereby inflicting such pain on their author that he shut himself up, and doomed himself to death by starvation? Are you not yourselves every day, in yo ur efforts to
illumine the darkness of antiquity, cutting and hewing with the new axes of
imperial rescripts and edicts, that whole ancient and rugged forest of your laws?
Has not Severus, that most resolute of rulers, but yesterday repealed the ridiculous laws which compelled people to have child re n before the Julian laws allow
matrimony to be contracted, and that though they have the aut hority of age
upon their side? There were laws, too, in old times, that parties against whom a
decision had been given might be cut in pieces by their creditors; however, by
common consent that cruelty was afterwards erased from the statutes, and the
capital penalty turned into a brand of shame. By adopting the plan of confiscating a debtor's goods, it was sought rathe r to pour the blood in blushes over his
face than to pour it o ut. How many laws li e hidden out of sight which still
require to be reformed' For it is neithe r the number of their years nor the dignity of their maker that commends them, but simply that they are just; and therefore, when their injustice is recognized, they are deservedly condemned, even
though they condemn.
We could hardly find a clearer statement that natural law stands above civil enactments than that in the first sentence above. Civil laws which prohibit good as defined by
natural law have no legitimate force; natural laws against an evil, though lacking statutory
support, are still binding.
This principle forces an obvious insight into civil laws. They are no more than enactments of human beings and must be treated as such. When human error has been discovered, the law must be rescinded.
The last paragraph is crucial to T ertullian's argument. He does not bitterly accuse his
readers of evil or stubbornness. He gently explains that they may have followed bad laws
o ut of ignorance. But the laws should now be reviewed. Only one criterion can justify
keeping a law: the justice of the law.
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We turn to Tertullian's explicit discussion of the Scriptures in chapters 18-20. The standard edition of The Apology has 50 chapters, the section on the Scriptures appearing
about one third of the way in the work. If Tertullian based his argument on the authority
of the Scriptures, he would have developed the first third of the book as an apology for
them and in the last two thirds argued from them. But he does not, as we have noted.
We can show how this is the case by comparing the arguments of chapters I 7 and I S.
Chapter I 7 describes how humans have a kind of natural knowledge of Cod.
The eye cannot see Him, though He is (spiritually) visible. He is incomprehensible, though in grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though
our human faculties conceive Him. He is therefore equally real and great. But
that which, in the ordinary sense, can be seen and handled and conceived, is
inferior to the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is tainted,
and the faculties by which it is discovered; but that which is infinite is known
only to itself. This it is which gives some notion of Cod, while yet beyond all our
conceptions- our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of
what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as
at once known and unknown. And this is the crowning guilt of men, that they
will not recognize One, of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant. Would you
have proof from the works of His hands, so numerous and so great, which both
contain you and sustain you, which minister at once to your enjoyment and
strike you with awe; or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul
itself? Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, though led astray by
depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to
false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep,
or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of Cod;
using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true Cod. "Cod is
great and good," which may Cod give," are the words on every lip. It bears witness, too, that Cod is judge, exclaiming, "Cod sees, and, "I commend myself to
Cod," and, "Cod will repay me.'· 0 noble testimony of the soul by nature
Christian! Then, too, in using such words as these, it looks not to the Capitol,
but to the heavens. It knows that there is the throne of the living Cod, as from
Him and from thence itself came down.
This passage mirrors themes of Romans I: ISff. and Acts 17:24ff., though differences
also appear. The ideas about the testimony of material nature to Cod have been transmuted from the Scriptures, if we must find sources, through such predecessors as the
African Munucius Felix (The Octavius, chapters 17- IS). Tertullian's reflections upon his
predecessor's work may have shaped how he read the Scriptures.
Tertullian values the testimony of the soul. While he argues that reflection on the
material universe leads to recognition of the living and transcendent Cod, he also says
that the inner soul of the human involuntarily testifies to truth about Cod. Then he makes
the astounding observation that the soul is naturally Christian (ani mae naturaliter
Christianael. Bray 'O claims that Tertullian hardly ignores the fallen condition of the
human, since he had just catalogued shackles that inhibit a clear knowledge of Cod. This
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claim is true, yet the whole point of the words which follow the recognition of this condition is that the soul persistently reflects an apprehension of Cod.
Now we turn to chapter 18 which specifically mentions the Scriptures.
But, that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative knowledge at once
of Himself, and of His counsels and will, Cod has added a written revelation for
the behoof of every one whose heart is set on seeking Him, that seeking he may
find, and finding believe, and believing obey. For from the first He sent messengers into the world-men whose stainless righteousness made them worthy to
know the Most High, and to reveal Him- men abundantly endowed with the
Holy Spirit, that they might proclaim that there is one Cod only who made all
things, who formed man from the dust of the ground (for He is the true
Prometheus) who gave order to the world by arranging the seasons and their
course. These have further set before us the proofs He has given of His majesty
in His judgments by floods and fires, the rules appoint by Him for securing His
favour, as well as the retribution in store of the ignoring, forsaking and keeping
them, as being about the end of all to adjudge His worshippers to everlasting
life, and the wicked to the doom of fire at once without ending and without
break, raising up again all the dead from the beginning, reforming and renewing
them with the object of awarding either recompense. Once these things were
with us, too, the theme of ridicule. We are of your stock and nature: men are
made, not born, Christians. The preachers of whom we have spoken are called
prophets, from the office which belongs to them of predicting the future. Their
words, as well as the miracles which they performed, that men might have faith
in their divine authority, we have still in the literary treasures they have left, and
which are open to all.
T ertullian does not mince his words. Knowledge given through revelation is superior
to that given through any other form, not just parallel to it. Echoes of the Scriptures are
numerous, as are more muted echoes of the rule of faith. Likening his former attitude to
that of his auditors, as a mocker of Christian ideas, Tertullian reinforces the view that calm
reflection can result in great change.
The balance of chapters 18-20 gives an apology for the Scriptures in three strokes. Its
divine authority is shown by: (I) the remarkable translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into
Creek (chapter 18); (2) the antiquity of the Hebrew Scriptures which predate the Creeks,
Egyptians, or other ancients renown for their wisdom (chapter 19); and (3) the amazing
fulfillment of scriptural prophecies (chapter 20l.
Thus, chapters 18-20 offer an apology for the Hebrew Scriptures. But once Tertullian
finished these comments, he returned to his previous argument and employed it throughout the balance of the book. Noting that Christianity was born in the time of Tiberius,
and thus is not so ancient as the religion of Israel, he connects the two eras by observing
that the prophets of Israel predicted the coming of Jesus. But we hear no citation of the
New Testament Scriptures, only echoes them .
Tertullian's next move (in chapter 21) is stunning. He compares teaching about Christ
w ith themes found in pagan thought.
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Accordingly, He appeared among us, whose coming to renovate and illuminate
man's nature was pre-announced by God- I mean Christ, that Son of God. And
so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener
and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us,
born- but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His
paternal origin. It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a sister, or
by violation of a daughter or another's wife, a god in the shape of serpent, or ox,
or bird, or lover, for his vile ends transmuting himself into the gold of Oanus.
They are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of Jupiter were done. But
the Son of God has no mother in any sense which involves impurity; she whom
men suppose to be His mother in the ordinary way, had never entered into the
marriage bond. But, first, I shall discuss His essential nature, and so the nature of
His birth will be understood. We have already asserted that God made the
world, and all which contains, by His Word, and Reason, and Power. It is abundantly plain that your philosophers, too, regard the Logos- that is, the Word and
Reason- as the Creator of the universe. For Zeno lays it down that he is the creator, having made all things according to a determinate plan; that his name is
Father and God, and the soul of Jupiter, and the necessity of all things. C1eanthe
ascribes all this to the spirit, which he maintains pervades the universe. And we,
in like manner, hold that the Word, and Reason, and Power, by which we have
said God made all, have spirit as their proper essential substratum, in which the
Word has inbeing to give forth utterances, and reason abides to dispose and
arrange, and power is over all to execute. We have been taught that He proceeds forth from God, and in that procession He is generated; so that He is the
Son of Cod, and is called Cod from unity of substance with God.
Tertullian boldly compares Christian and pagan ideas. Pagan ideas, he implies, can be
drawn from two kinds of sources, myths and philosophy. The two do not have equal
value. Though myths may resemble Christian teaching in that both refer to a divine son,
they differ in that Christ's birth is unlike anything their vile stories report. Some philosophy, on the other hand, more closely resembles Christian teaching, since both speak of
the Creator as God's Word, Reason, and Power. Tertullian hardly suggests that philosophers who spoke in this fashion had a clear idea of the truth, but he believes they were
approaching truth, and this is far from the case with the myths.
Christians, according to T ertullian, read the Scriptures for two reasons. First, as
implied in what we have noted, they provide clear knowledge of the truth; second, they
give clear directives for living. For the second, I include the one instance, and the only
instance I have discovered, in which Tertullian explicitly cites from the Bible in The
Apology and indicates he is doing so (chapter 31).
But we merely, you say, flatter the emperor, and feign these prayers of ours to
escape persecution. Thank you for your mistake, for you give us the opportunity
of proving our allegations. Do you, then, who think we care nothing for the welfare of Caesar look into God's revelations, examine our sacred books, which we
do not keep in hiding, and which many accidents put into the hands of those
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who are not of us. Learn from them that a large benevolence is enjoined upon
us, even so far as to supplicate Cod for our enemies, and to beseech blessings
on our persecutors [Matthew 5 :44l. Who, then, are greater enemies and persecutors of Christians, than the very parties with treason against whom we are
charged? Nay, even in terms, and most clearly, the Scripture say, "Pray for kings,
and rules, and powers, that all may be peace with you' [I Timothy 2:2 Il. For
when there is disturbance in the empire, if the commotion is felt by its other
members, surely we too, though we are not to be given to disorder, are to be
found in some place or other which the calamity affects.

The Scriptures explain Christian behavior. Christians do the The Apology (hence the
quotation) what the Scriptures instruct them to do. Such use of the Scriptures has a
restricted purpose. T ertullian is not asking that his readers agree with them; he merely
asks that they note how seriously Christians read them. For Christians the Scriptures provide the rule of life.
Chapter 39 offers a fascinating description of Christian worship. In agreement with
what we have seen before, he here describes how the Scriptures shape Christian belief
and conduct. The new element in this passage is that through this window into early
Christian worship we envision the actual process.
I shall at once go on, then, to exhibit the peculiarities of the Christian society,
that, as I have refuted the evil charged against it, I may point out its positive
good. We are a body knit together as such by a common religious profession, by
unity of discipline, and by the bond of a common hope. We meet together as an
assembly and congregation, that, offering up prayer to Cod as with united force,
we may wrestle with Him in our supplications. This violence Cod delights in.
We pray, too, for the emperors, for their ministers and for all in authority, for
the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final
consummation. We assemble to read our sacred writings, if any peculiarity of
the time makes either forewarnings or reminiscence needful. However it be in
that respect, with the sacred words we nourish our faith, we animate our hope,
we make our confidence more steadfast; and no less by inculcations of Cod's
precepts we confirm good habits. In the same place also exhortations are made,
rebukes and sacred censures are administered. For with a great gravity is the
work of judging carried on among us, as befits those who feel assured that they
are in the sight of Cod; and you have the most notable example of judgment to
come when anyone has sinned so grievously as to require his severance from
us in prayer, in the congregation and in all sacred intercourse.
In chapter 9, T ertullian takes up the charges against Christians of criminal acts. He
begins by noting that pagans are guilty of infanticide. Citizens of his own country had formerly sacrificed infants to Saturn, and some continued the practice in secret. Tiberius, in
an unsuccessful effort to eradicate the evil, had actually ordered the priests involved to be
crucified. Why, T ertullian ironically asks, should Roman officials want Christians to worship the very deity unable to save his own children?
He next takes up the issue of cultic murder beyond that of children and mentions
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cases where it was still practiced. He notes one instance in which the pagans, because
they sacrificed a beast-fighter so his was not innocent blood, did not think it a crime. He
queries: "Is it less, because of that, the blood of a man?"
Then, returning to the issue of infanticide, he asks whether sacrifice is the only way
such a vile act could be carried out. Pagans have found rnany ways to dispose of unwanted children and suffer no punishment: drowning, exposure, and abortion. The last, he reasons, is impossible for Christians.

In our case, murder being once for all forbidden, we may not destroy even the
foetus in the womb, while as yet the human being derives blood from other
parts of the body for its sustenance. To hinder a birth is merely a speedier mankilling; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is born, or destroy
one that is coming to birth. That is a man which is going to be one [homo est et
qui est futurusl; you have the fruit already in its seed.
Tertullian next considers blood-eating. Human blood had been consumed for several
reasons: to seal a covenant between friends, to initiate one into the cult of the goddess
Bellona, to cure epilepsy by consuming the blood of gladiators. Then, having mentioned
the games, Tertullian goes on to speak of those who devour bears which have in their viscera undigested human flesh . He asks: Is this really less than cannibalism? We note in this
passage how he alludes to the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:29).
Blush for your vile ways before the Christians, who have not even the blood of
animals at their meals of simple and natural food; who abstain from things strangled and that die a natural death, or no other reason than that they may not
contract pollution, so much as from blood secreted in the viscera . To clench the
matter with a single example, you tempt Christians with sausages of blood, just
because you are perfectly aware that the thing by which you thus try to get
them to transgress they hold unlawful.
After naming more cases of murder or cannibalism, justified by the pagans, Tertullian
turns to the issue of incest. We hear again the same litany of contradictions between
pagan rage at what Christians supposedly do and what is known of them. The practice of
incest was enjoined by Jupiter, reported of Persians, and glorified by Greeks in the story of
Oedipus. Exposure of infants makes a pagan vulnerable to unintentional incest. Here is a
infant left to the elements, picked up by a sympathetic stranger, and raised to maturity.
Years later, not knowing the biological origins, the pagan giving way to uninhibited lust
may have intercourse with this relative.
In contrast, Christian sexual ethics provide absolute protection from incest. The discipline of the church is clearly visible.
A persevering and steadfast chastity has protected us from anything like this:
keeping as we do from adulteries and all post-marital unfaithfulness, we are not
exposed to incestuous mishaps. some of us, making matters still more secure,
got away from them entirely the power of sensual sin, by a virgin continence,
still boys in this respect when they are old.
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THE SCRIPTURES IN THE ApOLOGY'S ARGUMENT

We return to the issue raised earlier, whether Tertullian contradicts himself when he
says one thing in The Prescription Against Heretics and does another in The Apology.
Actually, the contradiction might be more profound than at first recognized. In this case
T ertullian would have explicitly argued for one method of discovering truth and excluded
another in The Prescription and then would have syste matically used the excluded
method in The Apology.
Within The Apology T ertullian follows the techniques of Roman legal debate. He
depends upon the principles of natural law and its corollary, general revelation, to an
astonishing degree. He applies the principles in various ways to show how they confirm
Christian thought. His argument from the beginning to the end proceeds on the assumption that this mode of argumentation is valid and will succeed. He nowhere breaks from
it. He nowhere leaves us with the impression that he is merely playing the pagan's game
but does not believe their rules are valid. Observations made now and then about the
Scriptures introduce no new pattern of argument.
All of this leads us to an important conclusion. T ertullian really believes natural law
and the Scriptures converge in some ways. We do not ignore that he acknowledges the
serious problems w ith natural reason, as was discussed in the passage from chapter 17.
But he suggests that in all people the soul innately knows something better about Cod
than pagan thought reflects.
Does all of this make the Scriptures irrelevant? Or, to put the question a different way:
Are there two equally reliable paths to the truth about Cod and his will, Scripture and natural reason and law? We observe several points in this regard, both drawn from The Apology.
What the pagan world offers is a mass of confusion within which there are only shreds
of truth. These shreds are so mixed with error that pagans never follow them up.
Therefore, he does not appeal to natural law so that pagans will follow it by itself but that
they will note how their better thoughts parallel themes in Christian teaching.
The Scriptures, on the other hand, offer clear direction, and they are the source of
Christian faith and practice. Nowhere in The Apology does T ertullian sugges t that
Christians have come to the truth about Cod (that he is spiritual and one) or do correct
things (such as not kill or be chaste) because natural reason or natural law has enlightened
them. The Scriptures awaken within the latent but darkened shreds of truth that natural
reason and law reflect. They give clear instruction on the truth .
If this is all true, then, a second issue must be considered, the relation of the Scriptures
to the 'rule of faith.' As is well known, Tertullian and Irenaeus (Against Heresies 3:4:1 -2;
4:26:2-3) first articulated the concept of the rule, the form er stating it in boldest form (The
Prescription Against Heretics chapter 19, see chapters 12ffJ A few comments must suffice.
First, T ertullian did not see a necessary tension between the rule and the Scriptures as
Protestants might. For him the two agreed perfectly, and any fear that an unresolvable
conflict might arise is anachronistic.
Second, Tertullian appealed to the rule's authority in debates with gnostics. He did so
for a simple reason: Both Catholics and gnostics believed the Scriptures supported their
teachings; and the gnostics, it should be noted, had developed sophisticated interpreta-
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tions and hermeneutics. Tertullian knew how well the gnostics went about their business
and how skillfully they confused simple Catholics through a display of scriptural learning.
So he short-circuited their claims by saying that according to the rule, which every
Catholic knew, their case fell apart. It was not necessary in his opinion to refute them
point by point from the Bible, showing how the Catholic view was correct and the gnostic wrong. Tedious debates (as his longest work, Against Marcion) had their place, and he
hardly feared that Catholics could not prove their case by the Scriptures. But gnostic
views contradicted Christian faith at its core, as witnessed to in the rule, and their learning
was merely a display which confused the issues.
A more serious question may be embedded in our query about the relation of the rule
to the Scriptures in Tertullian's thought: Have church traditions invaded and reshaped
Christian teaching, so that they fundamentally contradict the Scriptures? Frequently, we
hear the compJaint that second, third, and fourth century teachers of the church converted
the Hebrew religion of Jesus and the apostles into the Greek one of historic orthodoxy.
The complaint, however, is often driven by an agenda, so that the scholars object
when the early teachers of the church failed to endorse their favorites views which they
imaginatively find in the heroes the Bible. Adolf Harnack " is sure the ontological language
of orthodoxy betrayed Jesus' simple gospel and made Christianity impossible for modern
people. Anders Nygren '2 is sure Tertullian is little more than a Christian moralist and did
not understand Paul and grace, as Luther did. G. E. Wright') is sure the language of the
creeds obscured the Old Testament's vision of the God who acts. The list could go on. I
only make a few comments relevant to our present task.
This complaint is wrong-headed and simplistic. There is no doubt that there is a clear
attempt to translate the Gospel into language that conforms to the cultural environment
the church lived in. But that is quite another thing from betrayal of its basic values. We
can in fact argue the reverse: Unless the Church can translate its values into the language
of its cultural environment, it has not really grasped the heart of these values. The pertinent question is: Does the church speak the language of the people and replace the values embedded in that language with Christian values? That is precisely what Tertullian
attempted to achieve in the Apology.
Using hellenistic categories and hellenistic terms as justice, treason, and sacrilege,
Tertullian redefined what those concepts ought to mean, infusing them with Christian values. He did not argue that a nation can survive without justice; he did argue that the pure
Gospel provides the best picture of justice. He did not argue that a nation can survive
without divine worship; he did argue that Christians alone really know the true God and
how to worship him. He did not argue that a civilization can survive without obedience;
he did argue that Christian ethics offered the highest form of serving the state. Whether
the new definitions he gave to the terms were correct, whether his arguments were convincing, and whether he betrayed the Gospel at this or that point are not our major concern. In The Apology Tertullian redefined in legally approved terms the values of Roman
civilization according to his Christian understanding of justice, citizenship, and religion.'4
In a little more than a century after Tertullian wrote, the Roman Empire officially
became Christian. Measuring The Apology's role in converting the empire offers special
difficulties, since the intellectual transformation of a culture is hidden from public view.

74

Livermore

We can see events which suggest a transformation is happening; we cannot see the
process itself or describe all the factors in it. It might be easy to assign more success to
T ertullian than he m erits; certainly others made great contributions. However, the nature
of his treatise suggests that his work was more important than some wish to
acknowledge.' 5
The collapse of paganism's dominance in the Mediterranean world signifies more than
purely political decisions or military acts. Paganism had lost its credibility; it no longer
explained the world. The temples were empty and the ir priests went unpaid, because the
values these institutions required for maintenance were no longe r embraced. The intellectual universe had shifted in a Christian direction.
Several factors are involved in the intellectual foundation of a civilization: (I) What
questions does its spend its intellectual energy trying to solve? (2) What criteria does it use
to judge truth from error? (3) What terms does it use to embody its values? (4) What definitions do these cruical te rms possess? In The Apology Te rtullian did not set the agenda
for the first three questions. The Romans decided that service of the state through divine
worship was crucial for the survival of the state, that judicial review could occur unde r an
appeal to natural law, and that treason and sacrilege were criminal acts. It is in the last category, the definition of these terms, that T ertullian made his contribution.
Though many bemoan Constantine's act as the tragic time when the church invited
the world into its sou l, it was inevitable. Certainly it was to his political advantage.
Certainly the spiritual fervor of the church contributed; "the blood of Christians [was]
seed" (chapter SOl. But the intellectual groundwork had also been laid. The case for
paganism had been eroded. Rage against Christians for the crimes of treason and sacrilege
could not be sustained, because huge numbers of people now understood these concepts
in more Christian terms. The church had succeeded in transvaluing them.
To take terms infused with pagan values and redefine them so they bear Christian values, as Tertullian attempted and in some degree accomplished in The Apology, is a
supreme act of the loyal opposition.' 6
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